ABSTRACT
OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF VANETS
Vehicular communications is an emerging part that has attracted much interest from academia and industry. In this chapter, we explore the aspects of vehicular communications and vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANET) to draw our attention on Vehicle-to-Infrastructure traffic model. In particular, we examine certain mechanisms to security-proofing a vehicular network, to provide quality of service according to certain needs and to route data traffic
What is a VANET?

Inter-Vehicle Communication Challenges
The vehicular networks pose some serious challenges (Blum, Eskandarian, & Hoffmman, 2004) as the network's deployment is not an easy task. Moreover, the sparse deployment of the roadside infrastructure often plays key role to the smooth operation of the network.
Furthermore, we outline some of the major challenges that vehicular networks face and the possible ways that roadside equipment can help mitigate or even overcome those challenges.
• Absence of central coordination: While this is a major drawback of the purely adhoc part of the network, it poses no threat for the vehicle-to-infrastructure communication model, as the infrastructure assumes the role of the central coordinator for all the nodes that are in communication range with it. • Dynamic network: One of the special traits of a vehicular network is its dynamic nature, which is a result of the mobile nodes and the high speed they develop considering the fact that they are vehicles. This results in a highly disconnected network, where the communication windows between nodes are often narrow. However, the deployment of the infrastructure and its use as an active part of the network comes from the need to solve the previously reported problem. Thus, infrastructure is employed to provide a level of stability to the dynamic network by coordinating the communication between its participants. • Security concerns: Even though it will be analyzed later in chapter, it is really important to mention the issue of security that has risen with the VANET deployment. While the need for privacy and a secure environment is imperative to the deployment of a vehicular network, such environment cannot be guaranteed without the assistance of roadside networks. In this case, a certain security policy is enforced on the network and the infrastructure is used to oversee it.
VANET Applications
In that regard, it is important to identify the four major categories (Kamini & Rakesh, 2010) of applications that exist in a VANET and provide numerous services:
• Safety-oriented applications: Examples include emergency break warning applications and lane-change warning applications. Safety-oriented applications are, as the name implies, applications that focus on providing the VANET nodes with the necessary mechanisms in order to maximize accident prevention and mitigate an accident's impact on the rest of the network.
• Service-oriented applications: Also known as infotainment applications, aim to provide the VANET participants with several services. They strive to make the driving experience of both driver and passengers more comfortable through various applications and services. That may include Internet access, media streaming, online gaming, etc.
• Traffic efficiency applications: Target at the improvement of traffic flow, reduction of road congestion, provision of alternate routes. This can be achieved in various ways such as electronic toll collection, rail intersection management, congestion awareness and information, real-time traffic conditions etc.
• Driver assistance applications: Aim to provide a secure and comfortable experience for the driver of the vehicle. Digital road maps downloading, navigation systems, parking assistance and automatic emergency call are only some of the services that can be provided and add up to providing as much assistance as possible to the driver, without in any case compromising the driving experience.
It must be noted that this general taxonomy is affected by the vehicle-to-infrastructure relation. It is needless to say that certain applications could not achieve the required performance of delay, throughput and other network metrics if they were left to operate only in an ad-hoc manner (see Table 1 ).
Vehicular Communications: Vehicleto-Infrastructure (V2I)
In this chapter, we specifically examine the V2I part of the vehicular communication model. V2I communications (Wiesbeck & Reichardt, 2010) refer to communication between road users and roadside equipment that is based on short or medium range communication technology. However, it must be noted that this architecture does not rely on the infrastructure in order to operate but rather exploits it to improve the network performance. Things that surely are essential for the existence of such a relation are: 1. A hybrid network meaning the existence of both vehicles and roadside equipment (in areas where the roadside equipment is either non existent or sparse, we cannot provide vehicle-to-infrastructure communications). 2. Protocols and mechanisms that support such a communication for both ends, vehicles and the infrastructure. Due to the special nature of the relation between vehicles and the roadside unit, the necessary interfaces are a pre-requisite. Routing protocols tailored for V2I communications are the most common example of this necessity. 3. Deployable penetration that means the existence of a sufficient number of roadside units placed alongside the highway or urban roads. We must note that another really important factor that shapes both the network penetration and deployment but also the service provision through protocol and mechanism design, is that the network operation must be efficient with a certain minimum of deployed infrastructure, at least for the early stages of its operation.
The IEEE 802.11p Standard
In the discussion about vehicular communications, one should not miss to mention the only (up to now) standard for this kind of communications. That is the IEEE 802.11p standard that has been developed to support both vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. This standard utilizes the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) to complete wireless transactions and operates on the licensed band of 5.9 GHz for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). The IEEE 802.11p standard supports vehicle-based communications and services such as toll collection, safety services and commercial transactions via vehicles. These services involve greatly the vehicle-to-infrastructure communication model.
The P1609 Standard Family
The P1609 standard family (IEEE Standard -P1609) also known as the upper layer WAVE standard is used to define the architecture, communication model and mechanisms of high-speed short range wireless low latency communications. Together with 802.11p, P1609 standard family comprises the base of the Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) architecture. Collectively the IEEE 1609 (1609.1, 1609.2, 1609.3, 1609.4, 1609 .11) Family of Standards for WAVE describes wireless data exchange, security, and service advertisement between vehicles and roadside devices.
Work in Progress
Many initiatives across the world (Olariu & Weigle, 2009 ) have taken up the development of vehicular networks. The main objective of vehicular network deployment is to make transport safer and in particular to address issues and scenarios that are not addressed by the V2V component of vehicular communications. However, the stakeholders take interest in promoting serviceoriented and infotainment applications to improve travel comfort. In many countries worldwide, the research for vehicular communications have been aggregated under an organization or initiative (Motsinger & Hubbing, 2007) and some of those have already deployed early stages of vehicular networks, while focusing on both V2I and V2V communications, in specific cities or regions around the world. Some of the most known initiatives that strive to improve vehicular communications are Japan's Smartway project (http:// www.its.go.jp/ITS/topindex/topindex_sw2007. html) which has started its deployment in Tokyo and other regions in Japan and ITS Japan (http:// www.its-jp.org/english) that strives to improve road transportation systems. Also, U.S.A's VII Finally, the international CALM (Communications Access for Land Mobiles -since 2007) initiative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Communications,_Air-interface,_Long_and_Me-dium_range) that has set its attention to setting the standards for vehicular communications and wireless technologies and comprises the base for several other initiatives that work on different areas of vehicular communications. The rapid and efficient spread of this type of networks is obvious across the globe in the recent years with only beneficial outcomes for the vehicular traffic.
Chapter Overview
The vehicular communications field and the vehicle-to-infrastructure component in particular have been debated for a long period by the research and scientific field. The majority of the research in vehicular communications has been directed in the purely ad-hoc part of the network in the vehicle-to-vehicle component.
At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that if we want to meaningfully contribute and make groundbreaking progress, we can no longer ignore the fact that the roadside network exploitation can offer vast improvement to the network performance in all its aspects and provide efficient solutions to matters where V2V architecture fails to address and solve.
Many key subjects that have to be resolved efficiently include quality of service provision, security proofing, and provision of a routing algorithm for the network and its participants.
This chapter overviews these three important aspects of the network, outline the current problems that they currently face and provide an aggregation of the proposed solutions in each respective field, always in relation with the vehicle-to-infrastructure architecture.
The reader is also introduced to the basic architecture, communication model, and characteristics of vehicular communications, in order to obtain a full understanding of vehicular networks.
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN VANETS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
We cannot actually argue about a deployable VANET architecture without first concerning ourselves with the security aspects of this particular type of network. The need of finding efficient solutions to secure-proofing the vehicular environment is by all means imperative and the research on possible ways to fulfill the security requirements is continuous. In the following section, we try to aggregate and enumerate all these requirements and later on examine and present various solutions, in the form of targeted protocols, schemes, or mechanisms.
Mandatory Security Features for Vehicular Communications Networks
In this section, we investigate the security features (Yue, Jun, & Ju, 2009 ) that a VANET should have in order to be considered secure in all its aspects.
• Authentication: Authentication is a major requirement in VANET security because it ensures that the senders of messages are valid VANET members. However, the authentication process raises concerns about the privacy protecting of the vehicular nodes and this trade-off is investigated in detail later on. 
The Problem
As it has already been mentioned, it is obligatory for VANET to have security provision for safety as well as infotainment applications. Due to the unique characteristics of VANETs, the aforementioned provision is not always guaranteed. Some of the problems that have risen from the security requirements are being addressed by the solutions presented in this chapter as follows:
It is clear that researchers aim to a unified scheme that utilizes the necessary set of tools in order to supply VANET with an acceptable level of security. In the rest of this chapter, we outline and further analyze mechanisms, schemes and targeted protocols (proposed either in academia or in industry) that try to accomplish the general objective of securing VANETs. In most cases, many mechanisms and protocols are tied and work together to achieve that outcome.
Challenges and Problems in Vehicular Security
Being a special category of MANETs, VANETs have some unique characteristics that make their large scale deployment harder and pose some unique challenges (Stampoulis & Chai, 2007; Papadimitratos, Gligor, & Hubaux, 2006) . For example, the information conveyed over a vehicular network may affect life-or-death decisions, making fail-safe security a necessity. However, providing strong security in vehicular networks raises important privacy concerns that should also be considered. The deployment of vehicular networks is rapidly approaching, and their success and safety will depend on viable security solutions acceptable to consumers, manufacturers, and governments.
Tradeoff between Authentication and Privacy
During authentication, all message transmissions need to be matched with their originating vehicles. On the other hand, personal information about vehicles should not be known to any other than the Trusted Authority (TA). In order to achieve efficient VANET security, these two completely opposite traits must come to equilibrium. This tradeoff is called resolvable anonymity. Therefore, a system needs to be introduced that enables vehicles to be anonymous to most participating nodes but also enables identification by central authorities in cases like accidents or malicious behavior.
Location Awareness
Certain location-based services are essential for most applications to be truly effective, so that reliance of the VANET system on GPS or other specific location based instruments can be increased as any error is likely to effect the supported applications.
High Mobility
Due to the high mobility of the nodes in VANETs, their topologies are highly dynamic and time windows are really narrow. This in itself is a major spatial and temporal constraint of the network. The proposed mechanisms, schemes or targeted protocols, should be able to perform all their operations concerning the secure-proofing of the network, while managing to satisfy these two constraints.
Privacy Problems and Proposed Solutions
It is clear from the previous contents of this section that preserving privacy plays a major role in securing VANETs in such a way that they would be deployable in large scale. Towards this direction, there has been great research efforts and many targeted protocols, novel schemes and mechanisms have been proposed to achieve this goal. Furthermore, we outline and investigate proposed ways that make this privacy-preserving claim a reality.
Cryptographic Privacy
When we are referring to cryptographic privacy, we imply all the attributes that make a network secure using means of cryptography. In general, it is required that a message should be resilient against the compromise of its security as well as its sender's. Thus, it is important the privacy preserving of the nodes and messages of the network but at the same time, efficient authentication should be achievable to make sure that malicious nodes will not be part of the network.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): Role, Use, and Effectiveness
Public Key Infrastructure, also referred to as PKI, is one of the most popular ways used to secure VANET because it can meet most of the security requirements of a vehicular network environment such as anonymity, authentication, non-repudiation, etc. PKI is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. In cryptography, PKI is an arrangement that binds public keys with respective user identities by means of a Certificate Authority (CA). The role of PKI that assures this binding is called the Registration Authority (RA). The term Trusted Third Party (TTP) may also be used for the Certificate Authority (CA).
As mentioned before, PKI mechanisms use digital signatures to bind a public key with the real identity of a vehicle; in such a way that the certificate can be used to ascertain that a public key belongs to a certain vehicle, thus, eliminating the problems of data authentication and message non-repudiation. Pseudonymous certificates allow us to achieve both privacy and authentication.
Another element of the PKI architecture is the Certificate Authority. that is the entity that issues the digital certificates to the nodes (vehicles) of the network. A certificate is a vehicle's public key and identifier signed by the CA. The main function of the digital certificate is to certify that a certain vehicle (its identity is only known to the CA) is the owner of a public key. This allows vehicles or RSUs to trust the signatures or assertions that are made by the private key that corresponds to the public key (private/public key pair) that has been certified by the CA.
It is well understood from the aforementioned definition of PKI that it comprises a set of elements that all together create a security net over VANET. In this regard, we review all the elements one-by-one and all together to have a complete picture of the way public key infrastructure secures VANETs.
Pseudonyms
The (long-term) root certificate provided by the CA and the pseudonym certificates (short-term) with corresponding key pairs (public keys-private keys) are assumed to be able to protect the vehicle's privacy by not linking the certificates directly to vehicles. Dötzer (2005) proposes a system for pseudonym security. The system operates under the assumptions that every vehicle is equipped with a tamper-resistant device, which offers secure memory to store secrets and secure computation as well as that the vehicle is able to execute small programs and cryptographic algorithms. It is further assumed that during production of the vehicle, a secure connection between this device and authority A is available, using Hardware Security Module (HSM). There are three operating phases in this system; the initializing phase (during which the systems of the vehicles are set up), the operational phase as the major mode of operation (during which vehicles can send messages signed according to a chosen pseudonym), and the credential revocation phase (during which predefined situations can lead to the disclosure of a vehicle's real ID and the shutdown of its system). Protection against misuse of the credentials is provided by the tamper-resistant device and the revocation mechanism provides robust network availability.
The main reason to maintain privacy in vehicular networks is to thwart any adversary that tries to compromise the network and its participants. In Sampigethaya et al. (2005) , the authors provide a solution to the problem of privacy preservation by allowing any vehicle to be able to achieve unlinkability between two or more of its locations in the presence of tracking by an adversary. The proposed scheme combines group navigation and a random silent period enhancement technique to provide user privacy and mitigate vehicle tracking. The assumptions of this scheme are a trusted authority and the ability for the authority to track a vehicle based on the strength of its signal. Between the pseudonym changes, the vehicle stays silent for a random period of time so the adversary cannot track it using temporal and spatial relation as observed in Leping, Matsuura, Yamane, and Sezaki (2005) .
The certificate authorities play an important role to the preservation of privacy in vehicular networks; not only to provide the legitimate nodes with the necessary certificates but also to prevent malicious nodes from harming the network. Papadimitratos et al. (2007) propose a system architecture in Papadimitratos, Buttyan, Hubaux, Kargl, Kung, and Raya (2007) that supports privacy protection and secure communication among others. One basic aspect of this system is the crosschecking of the vehicles between CAs so that security can be achieved in regional scale. Each node, being either a vehicle or an RSU, holds a unique id and a pair of public/private keys. The CA that manages the long-term certificates is responsible for their replacement once the old ones expire. To achieve privacy protection, each node is equipped with a set of distinct certified public keys known as pseudonyms and they are used to sign the outgoing messages of the vehicle. Frequent changes on these pseudonyms, issued by a trusted pseudonym provider, make tracking of vehicles extremely hard. Because of the variable rate of pseudonym switch depending mostly on network parameters (velocity, policy, number of nodes), the concept of pseudonym refill is also explained in which a node requests an (i+1) set of pseudonyms before his i set depletes.
In Freudiger et al. (2007) , the authors propose a scheme utilizing a protocol that both aim to provide unlinkability between the vehicle and its transmitted messages and provide location privacy for the driver. For this purpose, pseudonyms are utilized to disclose the driver's private information However, updating pseudonyms in a monitored area has been proven ineffective because the location information of the messages can still be used to exploit temporal and spatial tracking on the vehicle. This chapter assumes that the vehicles have a tamper-proof device and that before entering the network a vehicle registers with the CA and receives a set of pseudonyms. The authors also proposed the creation of anonymizing regions known as mix-zones in order to force pseudonym change to take place there. Because the effectiveness of the proposed approach lies mainly on the number of vehicles and the randomness of the zone's whereabouts, the authors also proposed the placement of these regions at road intersections where vehicles mix all together and their velocity and direction usually change. However, if the mix-zones have fixed or expected locations, the adversary may know where and when to launch an attack. For this reason, a protocol named CMIX is introduced that creates cryptographic mix zones, in which every vehicle uses a symmetric key to encrypt their sending data throughout the pseudonym change process and to keep it secure the RSU, which provides that symmetric key, changes it during the update process.
Building blocks of the VANET's privacy preservation are the vehicle's credentials and keys. This information should remain private from the rest of the network. Towards this direction, Papadimitratos et al. (2008) propose a system architecture addressing the privacy preserving of identity, credentials, key management and secure communications. This particular architecture assumes the existence of several CAs to service multiple regions as well as the ability to crosscertify vehicles when entering new regions. Every vehicle is registered with only one CA, and it has a long-term identity along with a pair of public/ private keys and a long-term certificate issued by the CA (which is later renewed upon expiration) that contains attributes of the node (mostly used for access control) and lifetime of the certificate. In order to satisfy the privacy requirement, this architecture uses pseudonyms that are switched frequently so the messages signed by these pseudonyms cannot be linked back to the originating vehicle. In order to obtain certificates, a vehicle issues a message to the CA over a secure channel, identifying itself and registering to the CA (via public key). After authentication, the vehicle sends a set of pseudonyms that contain an identifier of the CA, the lifetime of the pseudonyms, the public key and the signature of the CA, covering all the private information about the vehicle. This architecture also utilizes the aforementioned pseudonym refill mechanism.
Key factor to the non-traceability of the vehicular nodes and therefore the protection of their privacy, is for the use of pseudonyms for a short period of time. This concern is being addressed by Calandrielo et al. (2007) . The authors propose a scheme in which every node is equipped with a set of pseudonyms. Each pseudonym is used for limited period of time. The combination of pseudonyms and group signatures is the basic element of the proposed scheme. Every node is equipped with a group signature key and instead it generates its own set of pseudonyms and with the group signature key it generates a group signature on each pseudonym. In this scheme, the nodes can generate and self-certify their own pseudonyms.
Certificate Revocation
Due to the numerous threats in VANET, it is possible to revoke a certificate for one of the following reasons:
• Key Compromise: The private key of the vehicle or the RSU is suspected to be or is compromised.
• Change of affiliation: Some information about the certificate of the vehicle or the RSU or any other information is no longer valid.
The certificate is suspended.
• Cessation of operation: The certificate is no longer needed for its assigned purpose.
• Change of Policy: The CA no longer operates under the certain security policy and no longer service certificates.
The most common way to revoke a certificate is by using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) that contain the certificate identities of misbehaving nodes, are used to inform the nodes of the network about misbehaving nodes with revoked privileges in an attempt to exclude those nodes from the network. However, a challenge that remains is the distribution of this list to the vehicles, because due to the size of the network in can grow exponentially. Thus, the vehicular nodes before verifying any received message, each node checks whether or not the sender is included in the up-todate CRL. The real problem that rises with CRLs is their distribution, which is prone to long delays and might not always be an easy task because of the real-time nature of the mechanism, but also their creation because of their rapidly growing size due to the fast-changing pseudonyms of the network nodes. In the case of group signatures, the group manager is responsible to reveal the credentials of the suspicious vehicle for the CA to revoke its privileges.
In place of the CRL, due to its hard distribution to the vehicles, some other approaches have been proposed for the revocation of the misbehaving vehicles. Towards that direction, Wohmacher (2000) proposes the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), which can verify the current validity of a certificate online. If a more timely reaction is required, the proposed protocol can be employed instead of CRLs. The protocol is utilized between a client and a server where the client queries the server for a set of certificates in order to check their validity and the server after executing the necessary checks on its part, responds with the certificate validity status to the client. A certificate response from the server can be unknown, revoked, or good. Unknown means that the server has no information about the queried certificate, revoked means that the certificate has been revoked or is on hold and good may mean that the certificate has not been revoked, it has not been issued yet or the time the response was produced it was out of its validity. The OCS protocol is especially effective for attribute certificates (used to manage access control) in which the status information need to be up-to-date.
An almost certain pre-requisite to achieve privacy in vehicular networks is the existence of TPD units (Tamper-Proof Devices) on vehicles. Raya et al. (2007) take advantage of this and propose a protocol that leverages the presence of a TPD unit on board the vehicle. If the CA determines that a vehicle must be revoked, with the help of the roadside infrastructure, initiates a two-party end-to-end protocol with the tamper-proof device of the vehicle during which the CA instructs the TPD to erase all cryptographic material it stores and halt its operation upon completion of the protocol. The protocol actually "kills" the TPD, depriving the misbehaving node from its cryptographic keys and, thus, ensuring that all its messages are ignored by all other correct nodes.
Also in Raya et al. (2007) , the use of the RC 2 RL protocol is proposed that targets to the dramatic decrease of the time in which the nodes of a VANET can obtain an updated CRL. It is utilized when the CA (which is responsible for the revocation) wants to revoke only a subset of the vehicle's keys or when its tamper-proof device is unreachable. Given the large size of the CRL in VANETs, the protocol utilizes bloom filters (a probabilistic data structure used to test whether an element is a member of a set),thus, decreasing the CRL size to only a few KB and making it possible for it to be transmitted via radio frequency. This protocol relies on the infrastructure to broadcast the compressed CRL in frequent intervals.
Additionally in Raya et al. (2007) , the LEAVE warning system is proposed that relies on the collective information gathered from a vehicle's neighborhood. Due to the fact that LEAVE cannot sense or collect the necessary information on its own, it relies on a mechanism named MDS (Misbehavior Detection System). Since all vehicles can be attackers with the same probability, the warning messages may contain correct or wrong accusations. Given the limited amount of available evidence, vehicles rely on the assumption of honest majority and crosscheck all received accusations. An accusation issued by a node has a lower weight when this node is already accused by other participants. If the sum of weighted accusations (the eviction quotient) against a vehicle exceeds a defined threshold, it is locally evicted by LEAVE until the evicted node gets in the region of a CA and has his certificate revoked. More precisely, warning messages are transformed into disregard messages that instruct all the neighbors of the attacker to ignore its messages.
G r o u p S i g n a t u r e s : R e q u i r e m e n t s , Effectiveness, and Proposed Solutions
Group signatures address the privacy requirement by providing anonymity within a certain set of nodes, namely a group. A group consists of several group members and one Group Manager (GM). A group signature is produced by using the message to be signed, the secret signing key of the sending node and the group public key. A Group Signature scheme lets the members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group. Signatures can be verified with respect to a single group public key, but at the same time, they do not reveal the identity of the signer.
In general, a secure group signature scheme should fulfill the following requirements:
• Unforgeability: Only group members are able to sign messages on behalf of the group.
• Anonymity: Given a valid signature of a message, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard for everyone but the group manager.
• Unlinkability: Deciding whether two different valid signatures were computed by the same group member is computationally hard.
• Excludability: Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign on behalf of other group members.
• Traceability: The group manager is always able to open a valid signature and identify the actual signer.
Group signature-based mechanism is another proposed way that can preserve the vehicles' privacy in vehicular networks. Jinhua et al. (2007) propose a security framework to preserve VANETs using group signatures. In this framework, members of the network maintain only a small set of group public/secret key pairs and they are anonymous within the group from which they sign. This framework assumes that all the messages that exist in the network are authenticated.
Another group signature-based approach is proposed by . In this approach, the authors propose a group signature-based scheme that is based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption as it is explained in . The scheme is based on a zero knowledge protocol for SDH in which the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is applied. Xiaoting et al. (2007) propose among others a scheme for OBU-to-RSU communication based on ID-based group signatures. An identity string is used as a public key to sign the messages. That way, the workload caused by the certificate management process can be avoided, and the public key updating and revocation operations can become rather simple.
Privacy in Terms of Trustworthiness and Data Integrity
When we are referring to trustworthiness and data integrity in order to ensure privacy, we should discuss all the attributes that make a network secure, without using means of cryptography to conceal the node's information but rather to ensure the integrity and trusted origin of messages. In general, it is required that a message that exists in the network to be trustworthy and to maintain data integrity. The concepts of trustworthiness and data integrity have risen and several trust systems have been developed to fulfill them. Dhurandher et al. (2010) propose a robust algorithm to provide trustworthiness in VANET environment, namely VSRP. The algorithm provides trustworthiness by running reputation and plausibility checks. The algorithm takes into consideration three types of messages: application of brakes, traffic jam, and accident. These messages can highly affect the network if compromised. The algorithm uses a trust table in order to maintain the trust levels of its neighborhood; this table holds values from 0 to 4, 0 being the lowest trust value assigned to a malicious node. In order to manage the reputation slots for each neighbor (if a suspicious behavior is detected), the vehicle increases the counter assigned to that behavior and if it reaches a certain threshold, the general reputation counter for this vehicle drops by 1 unit.
Trustworthiness does not only reside in message trustworthiness but also to the regions in which the vehicles are moving. To ensure that the vehicles will be moving into trusted regions, Serna et al. (2008) describe a scheme to provide trust condition for the vehicle participating in VANETs, while being in a untrusted area (meaning a region that is serviced by a different CA). This scheme enables CA interoperability with no explicit agreements. Moreover, the concept of CA Federations is proposed in which an agreement is made between the different CAs on a security minimum for all of them to inter-operate and thus, eliminating untrusted territories. In this approach, instead of distributing new sets of "compatible" certificates to the VANET nodes, the only requirement is to give them access to the trusted repository of the CA Federation to update their local certificates.
Most of the schemes, mechanisms, and targeted protocols that aim to deem a network, message, or region trustworthy for its participants make use of infrastructure-assistance to achieve that goal. We are examining the Kerberos approach, included in the paper by Wex et al. (2008) , which is a successor of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. It relies on an online interaction with a central Key Distribution Center (KDC) for authentication in order to get a valid "trust" token for a service (contains a session key, a validity period and the requesting node's identity encrypted with the server's secret key). The authorization information is kept at the services locally. Due to scalability problems in large environments, newer versions of Kerberos also allow the central management of authorization information and their integration in the issued tokens. Gomez et al. (2011) assume the existence of fixed elements of the infrastructure with Internet connectivity and certain processing capabilities that also communicate with all vehicles that pass close to them. The infrastructure elements used in this approach are Road Side Unitsthat communicate with the vehicles, with other RSUs and with the Base Stations that connect to the Internet through backbone networks. An honest majority policy is applied, but the case of malicious node is not excluded entirely. The main focus of this approach is to identify and isolate such malicious users by means of an accurate trust and reputation management mechanism application. The proposed approach defines that every time it receives a message, it first checks the reputation of the sender in order to decide whether to drop, accept or accept and forward the message. These three actions represent the three levels of trust used in this approach, so a node can be not trusted (reject), more or less trustworthy (accept but not forward) and fully trusted (accept and forward). Each message has a corresponding severity to the sender's reputation with a severity maximum for each trust level depending on the message. Additionally, a reputation score will be computed for each node taking into account three different sources of information, namely: direct previous experiences with the targeting node, recommendations from other surrounding vehicles and, when available, the recommendation provided by a central authority through Road Side Units. Concerning the recommendations provided by the infrastructure (when available), they are used to identify and isolate malicious nodes travelling throughout the country. The central authority controlling RSUs can manage a database containing all those users who have been deemed malicious.
Authentication Problems and Proposed Solutions
Although in the previous section we described the significance of privacy in order to maintain a secure Vehicular Network, we should not perceive it to be the only goal. A vehicular network must provide in any case and at all times robust authentication for its participants while preserving their privacy. Authentication can and should be achieved in all the privacy schemes, either PKI-based or group signature-based, that have been developed for vehicular networks, as it is an integral part of the VANET security.
Subsequently, we present and examine several authentication architectures for VANET environment, in which Road-Side Units play an important role:
Chenxi et al. (2008) propose an RSU-aided message authentication scheme, called RAISE. In particular, when an RSU is detected, nearby vehicles start to associate with it. The RSU assigns a unique shared symmetric secret key and a pseudo ID that is shared among the vehicles. With the symmetric key, each vehicle generates a symmetric keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) and then broadcasts a message signed with this symmetric HMAC code instead. Receiving vehicles are able to verify the message by using the notice about the authenticity of the message disseminated by the RSU. The RSU knows the authenticity of the messages because it shares HMAC encryption keys vehicles they were disseminated to. In any circumstance that a vehicle cannot verify a received message, it will use the PKI-based scheme to do so.
In vehicular networks, message authentication must happen in such way that the receiver of the message knows for sure that the message is trusted. Studer et al. (2009) propose a mechanism that makes use of the public key infrastructure along with the roadside network to authenticate messages in the network. The sender signs its messages with TACK's private key and from time to time broadcasts its RA-signed certificate. The receivers can use these two pieces of information to verify the sender's validity. propose a protocol that accelerates the authentication (revocation check) process. A general PKI scheme is deployed and by utilizing it the authentication enhancement happens. Bilinear pairing and hash chains are used as tools to achieve this fastening in the authentication process. The sender calculates his revocation check and appends it in the message along with his public key, the OBU's ID, a timestamp and a HMAC which plays the role of the authentication code. The receiver checks the validity of that information and either verifies the sender or drops the message and updates the CRL adding the non-valid node.
A certain example where PKI-based and group signature-based solutions co-exist and operate in the same environment is proposed by . The ASIC verification scheme supports stand-alone aggregate signatures verification and aggregate certificates verification. Furthermore, it supports simultaneous aggregate signatures and certificates verification. Perrig et al. (2002) propose an authentication protocol, named Timed Efficient Stream Losstolerant Authentication (TESLA). TESLA, according to its creators has low communication and computation overhead, tolerates packet loss, and scales to a large number of nodes, characteristics that make it ideal for vehicular environments. TESLA also works under the assumption that all sender and receiver(s) loosely time-synchronized and on the precondition that either the sender or the receiver must buffer some messages. TESLA uses one-way hash chains to authenticate keys at the receivers. The main idea of TESLA is that the sender attaches to each packet a MAC (Message Authentication Code) computed with a key known only by the sender. The receiver buffers the received packet without being able to authenticate it. In subsequent event, the sender reveals the key to the receiver rendering him able to authenticate the packet.
While TESLA is vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as the sender can be flooded with time-synchronization requests to compromise its security, TESLA++, investigated in Studer, Bai, Bellur, and Perrig (2008) addresses exactly that particular weakness. In TESLA++, the receiver only stores a self-generated MAC to reduce the memory requirements. Since the receiver only stores a shortened version of the sent data, the sender firstly sends the MAC and then the message with its corresponding key. In TESLA++ authentication, the sender first sends the MAC to the receiver, which in turn checks to see if there is a corresponding key to it (checking to see if the message key has been broadcasted yet); if there is, the MAC is dropped. Once the key can be disclosed, the sender will send any messages and the key that is used to calculate their MACs.' To verify a message, the receiver first verifies the validity of the key by following the one-way key chain back to a trusted key. The receiver then calculates the shortened MAC of the message and compares it with the MAC and index stored in his memory. If the receiver has a matching MAC/key index pair in memory, the receiver considers the message authentic. In any other case, the receiver considers the message unauthentic and discards the message.
The contribution of Studer et al. (2008) is a framework for message authentication using a combination of Elliptic Curves Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures and TESLA++. Once an OBU verifies a message using TESLA++, it can verify the ECDSA signature if non-repudiation is required. The ECDSA component also provides authentication in multi-hop communications if the OBU has no memory of the TESLA++ MAC. Due to that versatility of multiple verifications, this framework can meet many of the security needs of VANET.
Adversaries in VANETs
We term as an adversary or attacker any node that tries to compromise the security of the vehicular network. Such nodes can achieve that either by launching various attacks in the network, depending on what they are trying to achieve or by operating in a totally different way, than the one defined from the network policy, causing problems for the other legitimate nodes.
Greedy Driver
Following the honest majority rule, a greedy driver that is a member of the VANET will try to mislead his fellow drivers for personal gain. For example, misleading the other members of the VANET to believe that there is congestion in the road ahead while there is not, would create much better driving conditions for him.
Eavesdropper
This kind of adversary tries to obtain others' personal information and credentials and causes a serious breach in the privacy of the network. The eavesdropper may use illusion attack to impersonate another vehicle in order to gain access to certain privileges or its personal information. A very effective way to minimize this adversary's effect on the network is using cryptographic privacy and to manage the sensitive data in tamperproof devices.
Pranksters
They are adversaries that will attempt to cause problems in the network to have fun. A prankster could also abuse the security vulnerability to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to disable applications or prevent critical information from reaching another vehicle.
Malicious Attacker
This kind of adversary deliberately attempts to cause harm on the vehicular network. Normally, this adversary has specific targets and has access to more resources than other adversaries. In general, such kind of adversaries will be less in numbers than other kinds; they pose probably the most serious threat for the VANET security provision system.
Security Attacks against VANET
In this section, we aim to categorize the major security attacks that have been launched on VANET and we attempt to summarize some of the solutions that have been proposed in order to diffuse or minimize the effect of those attacks on the network.
The most active fields of interest when it comes to security attacks in VANET are: anonymity, key management, privacy, reputation, location.
Anonymity
While VANET security tries to preserve the anonymity of its members, attackers may aim to discover the physical identity of a vehicle, in most cases with malicious intent.
Malicious Vehicle
One of the most important security requirements of VANETs is privacy. To avoid being tracked, the use of randomly changing pseudonyms is suggested. This can lead to a situation where a malicious vehicle M can easily change its identity to node N without being punished.
Key Management
Key management deals with the secure generation, distribution, and storage of keys. There are three main approaches for key management: key exchange, key agreement, and key management infrastructure.
Brute Force Attack
This attack in the form of exhaustive search for all the possible keys can pose a really serious threat against the members of the VANET, since the distribution of safety-related information should not be tampered with and is of crucial importance to the ITS system.
A proposed solution to this kind of attacks as proposed in Langley, Lucas, and Huirong (2008) operates under the condition that there is a unique identifier for each vehicle, such that one can learn if a vehicle is an authorized VANET participant. Because uniqueness in VANETs raises privacy issues, it has been decided to use Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), which is a piece of information unique to every vehicle., The process specifies calculating really large number, appending the VIN to that number and then hashing it with a hashing algorithm. Because of the uniqueness of the VIN in each vehicle and the use of random large numbers to generate the unique identifier, the probability of a security compromise from a brute force attack is dramatically decreased because not only the attacker would have to know the VIN of the vehicle, but also to guess correctly the random large number used and the hashing algorithm used to generate it.
Misbehaving and Faulty Nodes
While there is an honest majority policy in VANETs, none can guarantee that a certified node will not develop malicious behavior. Although, the default reaction of the network to such events is known, certificate revocation is not always applicable because it requires infrastructure support and the misbehaving of the suspicious node may not always hold reason for revocation by the CA. In this regard, many solutions have been developed and proposed in order to protect the members of the VANET from such malicious behavior. However, it must be noted that not all suspicious behaviors must be considered malicious but there should be a malfunction threshold.
A really efficient solution to this security compromise is a known scheme examined earlier in the certificate revocation section. The LEAVE scheme along with MDS that are proposed in Studer, Bai, Bellur, and Perrig (2008) but also C 2 RL are used to make certain that the misbehaving and faulty nodes will be dealt with in a fast and effective manner. In LEAVE scheme, we have a cooperation of the LEAVE protocol with the MDS mechanism to detect and locally isolate any misbehaving node until a CA comes in range to revoke the certificate of the misbehaving node. On top of that, what C 2 RL does is that is ensures a fast and efficient distribution time for the most up-to-date CRL from the infrastructure towards the vehicular nodes so that they have the knowledge to ignore messages of revoked nodes and avoid a possible security compromise.
Privacy
Privacy is a key aspect in VANET and refers to the ability of the drivers to protect sensitive information about them and their vehicles against unauthorized observers or malicious attackers.
Malicious User
In vehicular networks, privacy preservation is a key aspect for them to be deemed secure. Thus, keeping private the credentials and other valued information of the vehicle and the driver, from malicious users (in most cases, outsiders to the network) that have as a goal to cause damage by exploiting network vulnerabilities, is obligatory.
One solution to overcome the problem of malicious users involves the use of shared keys (Haas, Jason, Hu, Yih-Chun, Laberteaux, & Kenneth, 2010), issued and certified by a trusted third party, between a set of vehicles in the authentication process, that way when a message cannot be traced back to a single vehicle because of the sharing of the same key between a set of vehicles. Moreover, during the authentication process many keys are used by the vehicles because one key may belong to different vehicles. This also helps to the detection of a malicious node, because the RSU is able to trace back the set of keys to the misbehaving vehicle.
Traffic Analysis Attacks
This category of attacks is one of the most serious threats against the privacy of VANETs and it aims to compromise the anonymity of communications. There are many attacks under this category, such as message coding attack, message volume, etc.
A robust solution against these kinds of attacks is a proposed protocol, namely VIPER (Cencioni & Di Pietro, 2007) . The proposed VIPER protocol defines that the vehicles in a group (a group is defined as all the vehicles that are registered with the same RSU) will act as mixes for the outgoing messages. In particular, the messages are being re-encrypted via public key algorithm. Additionally, in order to prevent eavesdropper attacks, every message is encrypted using the node's secret encryption factor and the public key of the RSU. Subsequently, every relay node re-encrypts the message using its own encryption factor. The RSU is the only VANET's component in this architecture that can decrypt the message using its own private key and that is what deems VIPER resilient against traffic analysis attacks.
Reputation
Reputation is usually defined as the amount of trust inspired by a particular member of a community, for the particular purposes of this chapter, a vehicular network. Reputation systems are used to trust and encourage trustworthy behavior and work under the assumption that the majority of the network nodes are honest. In VANETs, these kinds of systems can be used to defend against compromised nodes, and malicious ones.
Malicious Nodes
The distribution of information about local traffic or road conditions is one of the emerging VANET applications, since it can increase traffic safety and improve mobility. However, one of the main challenges is to forward event-related messages in such a way that the information can be trusted by receiving nodes. Malicious nodes exploit exactly that by forwarding false traffic information.
While an honest majority policy is being followed in VANET environment, there are always nodes that attempt to compromise the network security. A very effective to halt the operations of pranksters, greedy drivers or malicious attackers is a trust-based system that dramatically reduces the effect of their actions. Using reputation systems (Wex, Breuer, Held, Leinmuller, & Delgrossi, 2008) , it is feasible for the valid or honest participants of the network to ignore messages or warnings from these nodes and maintain security.
Illusion Attack
Illusion attack is a new security threat on VANET applications in which the adversary intentionally deceives sensors of his own vehicle to produce wrong sensor readings. As a result, the corresponding system reaction is invoked and incorrect traffic warning messages are broadcasted to neighbors, creating an illusion condition on VANET.
A really effective solution against illusion attacks is plausibility checks (Dhurandher, Obaidat, Jaiswal, Tiwari, & Tyagi, 2010; Nai-Wei & HsiaoChien, 2007) . In a plausibility check, a node can calculate if a message he received is fake or real (trustworthy), based on measurements from its own sensor data or from data transmitted by other vehicles or even the local RSU. Based on these measurements and a set of rules to examine and filter the data, the node can make a judgment to either trust or drop the message.
Another proposal that attempts to thwart illusion attacks in vehicular communications is Trust and Reputation Infrastructure-based Proposal, in short TRIP (Marmol & Perez, 2012) . In TRIP, whenever a vehicle receives a message or warning from another vehicle it first checks the other vehicle's reputation in order to decide whether to drop or accept the message. Depending on the sender's reputation level, the receiving vehicle can drop the packet, receive but not forward it, or receive and forward it. In order for the receiving node to take this decision, a reputation score will be computed taking into account, direct experiences, recommendations from neighboring vehicles and recommendations from the central authority (through the RSUs). The RSU-provided recommendations are extremely useful as the central authority can provide information about the malicious nodes in the network. Due to the different set of recommenders, there are concerns about the accuracy of the system. However, with the contribution of RSU-acquired reputation information, there is an increased accuracy and resilience of the system.
Location
Location refers to vehicle position in a vehicular ad-hoc network. It is one of the most valuable pieces of information (used in geographic routing) and is often readily available through positioning services such as Global Positioning System (GPS).
Forging Positions and Sybil Attack
Position attacks can occur when the line of sight of the vehicle's sensors is blocked. An attacker can launch a position attack by modifying position packets, replaying false position packets and dropping critical position packets.
The Sybil attack is a well-known harmful attack in VANETs whereby a vehicle claims to be several vehicles either at the same time or in succession. In addition, a Sybil attack refers to an attack where the vehicle's identity masquerades as multiple simultaneous identities. The Sybil attack is harmful to network topologies, connections, network bandwidth consumption.
A solution that has been proposed in Hubaux, Capkun, and Jun (2004) involves the existence of tamper-proof GPS devices that can transmit the location information of the vehicle to the neighborhood of the vehicle or to an infrastructure. However, this approach has many limitations due to the existence of the tamper-proof GPS device and its known weaknesses.
Another solution to this attack has been proposed in Soyoung, Aslam, Turgut, and Zou (2009) where an approach called "timestamps series" is being proposed. This approach specifies that vehicles obtain certified timestamps, signed and issued by RSUs. An outgoing message contains a series of the most recently obtained timestamp certificates and "shows" them when it passes from RSU regions. The proposed approach takes advantage of the spatial and temporal correlation between vehicles and RSUs and assumes that is rather rare or impossible for two or more vehicles to pass from an RSU at the same time. Based on this, Sybil attacks can be detected and thus avoided when a vehicle receives multiple messages with very similar timestamp series.
An effective infrastructure-aided solution that can thwart a Sybil attack is an infrastructure-based architecture, namely NOTICE proposed in Rawat, Treeumnuk, Popescu, Abuelela, and Olariu (2008) . In NOTICE, sensor belts (infrastructure) are embedded in the highway itself. Pressure sensors that are placed in each belt allow every message to be associated with a physical vehicle passing over the belt. Thus, a vehicle cannot pretend to be multiple vehicles and there is no need for an ID to be assigned to vehicles. The placement of belts for the detection of passing vehicles is more effective than roadside infrastructure and the interaction is performed in a simple and secure fashion.
Position Cheating and False Position Disseminating
The position of a node is periodically broadcasted in beacon packets so that every node within the wireless transmission range is able to build up a table of neighboring nodes including their positions. When a node disseminates wrong position data many, if not all the services of the VANET are affected. Wrong position information could be the result of malfunction in the positioning hardware or may be falsified intentionally by attackers to reroute data. Malfunctioning nodes may degrade the performance of a system to some extent while rerouting of data through malicious nodes violates basic security goals such as confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, or accountability.
Most solutions for the mentioned attacks are decentralized without the assistance of the roadside network. However, the solution proposed in Yan, Olariu, and Weigle (2008) involves a V2I component. In particular, all vehicles are equipped with GPS devices and numerous sensors; based on these sensors, the vehicle can make judgments for itself on the authenticity of the position information it receives from its neighborhood. For the operation of the protocol it is essentially to assign a unique ID to the vehicle that can only be issued by the central CA since the vehicle's ID can be changed by the attacker to launch an attack.
Availability
Availability is defined as the ability of a user to access the network and its resources in order to service his request. When considering life critical information, unavailability of the network should not be a case. In general, unavailability of the network resources is a network state that we do want to anticipate.
Denial of Service
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is an attempt to make the resources of a network unavailable to its authorized users. Considering VANETs, this attack may be a serious threat to the network because of the safety and life-critical messages disseminated in the network.
An effective solution against DoS attacks in VANETs is proposed in Rawat, Treeumnuk, Popescu, Abuelela, and Olariu (2008) , where the NOTICE architecture dictates that a road belt will not react to a single incident reported by a vehicle. On the contrary, the belt will wait for subsequent corroborations of the reported incident before deciding to propagate the information to the other participants in the network. Thus, injecting false information into the belt (targeting to denial of service) is thwarted by this mechanism of NOTICE.
Concluding this section, we have extensively analyzed vehicular communications, and especially vehicle-to-infrastructure communications that is one of the most challenging tasks. We have introduced the basic requirements for secure vehicular networks and how these requirements can be fulfilled in order to have an efficient security provision of vehicular networks. We have also outlined the main challenges and trade-off that the researchers currently face towards this direction. Moreover, we have overviewed several works on privacy preservation, authentication efficiency and security attacks against vehicular networks. We have also performed a survey of vehicle-toinfrastructure security schemes, mechanisms, and targeted protocols and categorized them into a detailed taxonomy. This approach allowed us to identify the current problems to that particular field of vehicular communications and discuss various proposed solutions.
HETEROGENEOUS QUALITY OF SERVICE (QOS) IN VANETS
Quality of Service Provision: Definition, Metrics, and VANET Implementation
Quality of Service (QoS): the term refers to resource reservation control mechanisms. Basically, it enables the provision of different priorities for different applications, users or data flows.
In order to define and fully comprehend Quality of Service, there are some terms that need to be explained.
• Bit rate: Also referred to as data rate, is the number of bits that are conveyed per unit of time.
• Communication duration: Is the time during which there is an established connection between two elements of the VANET. Due to the network's highly dy-namic nature, we usually attempt to increase the connection's duration, maximize data throughput during that time, or even both.
• Delay/Latency: The time it takes for data to travel across the network from the sender to the receiver. Quality of Service provision guarantees a certain level of performance to a data flow, by meeting a required bit rate, delay, jitter, packet loss probability, Bit Error Rate, and communication duration.
Depending on the needs of applications and the transmitted data, such as life critical information, it is understandable that relaying messages over a large area without infrastructure support would have a negative effect on the delay and delivery ratio of messages and thus affecting negatively the quality of service provision in vehicular networks.
If we can improve QoS of VANETs in terms of delay, response time, and throughput, we could in many ways improve both safety and comfort of the driver and passengers of any vehicle.
Quality of Service Challenges in Vehicular Environment
Quality of service is a very important feature for safety-related applications (real-time) such as emergency break warning, congestion warning, etc. Service-oriented applications such as VoIP, streaming multimedia and online gaming are also affected by quality of service requirements. Due to the fast-changing environment of VANETs, the fulfillment of those requirements per application is a challenging task.
There are two major categories of applications in vehicular communications that require QoS provision and their requirements are totally different:
• Safety-Oriented Applications (time-sensitive) • Service-Oriented Applications (not time-sensitive) Safety-related applications, deliver critical life-or-death messages. This means that the data packets are small, compared to service-oriented messages but the network must be able to deliver those small data packets with short delays and high reliability.
Unlike safety-related services, in serviceoriented services the main objective is to maximize the amount of data that each vehicle receives, especially in the case of vehicle-to-infrastructure communications since this should happen before the vehicle leaves the coverage area of the roadside beacon.
Based on the above, we can safely assume that in VANETs, the real QoS challenges are packet delivery ratio and connection duration rather than typical QoS metrics such as end-to-end delay and jitter.
Vehicular Network Characteristics that Limit Quality of Service Provision
Due to the special nature of the VANET environment, there are some limitations imposed either by the network itself or by the vehicles participating in it (Cheng, Shan, & Zhuang, 2012) . These restrictions make the quality of service provision in VANETs a rather challenging task. Such limiting characteristics are:
• Dynamic Network Topology: Since the nodes participate in an ad-hoc wireless network, they do not have any restriction on mobility and the network topology changes dynamically. Hence, the admitted QoS sessions may suffer due to frequent path breaks, thereby requiring such sessions to be reestablished over new paths. In the following subsections, we examine several proposed ways to completely nullify or mitigate the effect of those VANET traits on the quality of service provision.
Heterogeneous QoS in VANET
Many different categorizations have been proposed to distinguish the individual needs of VANET's applications, with each one focusing on a different angle of the network.
Thus, depending on the type of traffic, there are three classes of services and the associated QoS requirements (Wang, Giannakis, and Marques, 2007) :
• Best effort services: Entail applications such as e-mail and http Web browsing. They come with a prescribed maximum allowable bit-error rate but pose no requirements on delay guarantees. • Non-real-time services: Involve missioncritical but delay-tolerant applications such as file transfers. They often require minimum rate (i.e., throughput) guarantees but do not impose any delay bounds.
• Real-time services: Such as safety-related applications, video conferencing and streaming entail guarantees on BER, throughput, and latency.
Another categorization focuses on the QoS provision depending on the application type (Sichitiu & Kihl, 2008 This category provides services such as passing and lane change. Clearly, these applications require close-range inter-vehicle communications with tight real-time constraints and can be implemented in either sparse roadside equipment environment or a ubiquitous roadside equipment environment. These applications also take into account the ZOR (Zone of Relevance) concept.
QoS Provision in Vehicular Environment and Proposed Solutions
Very few works focused on data transmission scheduling in roadside-to-vehicle systems so far. In this section, we survey vehicle-to-infrastructure architectures that have been developed to enable QoS provision for VANET applications.
Possible Modes of QoS Provision
QoS through Link-Reliability
A wide variety of applications is expected to be developed for VANETs. These applications have different requirements for properties such as delay, jitter, bandwidth, throughput and security. Most of these properties are strongly influenced by the successful transmission rates between intermediary nodes. Therefore, a mechanism that offers a way of choosing among options with distinguished successful transmission rates expectations can be used to support policies that provide different levels of end-to-end quality for distinct applications.
QoS via Throughput Maximization
Another network metric that plays an important role in QoS provision is network throughput. Taking into account the dynamic nature of the VANET and short time-frame that exists for Vehicle-to-Vehicle and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communications, it is imperative that a mechanism that can maximize the data throughput during that sort duration is a must. This mechanism applies mostly on service-oriented applications where a large amount of data must be transferred in short time.
QoS through End-to-End Delay Minimization
An attribute that is really important to safetyoriented applications is minimum delay. Due to the real time nature of all safety-oriented applications as well as the critical life-or-death information that are being disseminated, the delay of the messages must be kept to a minimum. Thus, bandwidth of the network is often reserved to service only this kind of messages, in order to fulfill the minimum delay requirement. This kind of QoS provision is tied to the VANET large-scale deployment and must be serviced at all times.
The above are only a few of the ways that quality of service can be provided in vehicular networks. As previously mentioned, we considered high throughput and link-reliability, which in turn grants higher connection duration, to be of key importance to the vehicular quality of service provision.
QoS Provision: Proposed Solutions for Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Environment
Subsequently, we outline several proposed solutions for quality of service provision for the vehicular environment and in particular for the vehicle-to-infrastructure communication model, which plays an important role in achieving this goal.
As found in Saleet et al. (2009) presented a protocol to provide quality of service in VANET routing, called AMR. This protocol ensures minimum end-to-end delay while maintaining a threshold for the connectivity probability and the hop count through each selected path. In the center of the cell there is a fixed infrastructure which is a Road Side Unit. This RSU is responsible of aggregating the location information about all vehicles within its cell. In AMR, the RSU located in the center of each cell acts as a location server. Therefore, the RSU is responsible for saving current location information about all the vehicles that belong to that cell. Each vehicle updates its location information to the RSU each time it moves one transmission range far from its previous location. This enables the local RSU to have a local view of the network composed by the vehicles it manages. Therefore, a map of routes will be constructed between the RSU and the vehicles.
A routing protocol is proposed by Ksentini et al. (2010) , that strives to achieve QoS in routing via RSU-assistance and proxy vehicle use, namely PVR. In PVR, a mechanism based on IEEE 802.11 is utilized, where the vehicular networks use the "cooperative and opportunistic" concept to shorten the access delay and to reduce the interference problem within the range of a RSU in a highway environment. In fact, vehicles which are located far apart of the gateway send data, by greedy forwarding, to some particular vehicles called proxies during the long disconnection period. When vehicles enter the RSU transmission range, only the proxy vehicle is allowed to transmit data to the RSU.
Exploiting travel information is a really efficient way to improve quality of service. Sun et al. (2006) propose a QoS-enabled routing protocol using travel information to a large extent, namely GVGrid. This protocol assumes that every node (vehicle) has a short-range wireless device that has the same transmission range across the network nodes. GVGrid partitions the geographic region into squares of equal-size called grids. During route discovery, GVGrid attempts to find the route that is expected to have long lifetime, based on the position of each vehicle. This expected lifetime of a route is determined by the vehicles' movement on that route and characteristics (such as traffic signals and stop signs) of the roads on which the route is based.
There have been many proposals as to how to provide quality of service through infrastructure exploitation. A particular architecture proposed by Zhang et al. (2007) operates under the assumption that the vehicles know the service deadlines of their requests. Thus, the RSU knows the deadline (duration) of the communication since the vehicles send the relevant information to the RSU when they enter its range. Due to the high mobility of the network, when a vehicle's request has not been serviced yet and the vehicle exits the regions of the RSU, the request is automatically dropped. With the aforementioned as a given, there have been proposed two scheduling schemes based on the parameters of data size and deadline. In the data size scheme, if the vehicle can communicate with the RSU at the same transmission rate, the data size can decide the duration of the communication. In the deadline scheme, if a request cannot be serviced by the RSU by its deadline it is automatically dropped.
Another approach is the proposal of a routing protocol to provide quality of service in vehicular environment. In their proposal, Korkmaz et al. (2006) assume the existence of roadside gateways that have two interfaces that the vehicles are connected to access Internet services, one for the wireless traffic, and one for the wired (Internet) traffic. It is also assumed that the transmission range of the RSU can be extended via multi-hop communication, but also that the downlink and the uplink packets have separate channels so there is no contention over the same medium. Another assumption made is that all the vehicles are equipped with GPS devices and the position information is exchanged via one-hop neighbors, therefore an access point to the wireless medium is also assumed to be equipped on the vehicles. CVIAQoS protocol is designed to provide throughput guarantees and fixed delay bound to soft real-time applications like safety-related applications, voice, and video streaming in linear vehicular networks. The best effort traffic is handled with the remaining bandwidth after allocating resources for real-time traffic. In CVIA-QoS, one time slot is divided into two periods, the High Priority Period (HPP) and Low Priority Period (LPP), respectively. In CVIA-QoS, packets admitted to HPP are delivered to the gateway in one time slot. Furthermore, an admission control mechanism is introduced where admission decisions are made by the gateways and executed by the temporary routers. Alcaraz et al. (2009) propose a mechanism to enhance the quality of service provision. The proposed mechanism attempts to minimize the backlog of data, meaning unprocessed requests/ data, which is equivalent of maximizing the throughput. This is being achieved by this particular mechanism by assigning different weights (relative importance factor) to vehicles according to their estimated connection lifetime.
Despite its numerous advantages, QoS provision via RSU assistance has some drawbacks, one of these being its ineffectiveness in sparse or no RSU environment. Ramirez et al. (2007) , propose a QoS-enabled routing protocol, namely AODVM that aims to connect the two network segments that comprise a vehicular network that is the mobile network and the fixed infrastructure respectively. The gateway discovery process, by the vehicles that need to communicate can happen in three different ways-proactively, reactively, and in hybrid manner-and in every way the existence of infrastructure is mandatory, so in sparse infrastructure environment this protocol would face several issues.
Unlike rural areas where the traffic load might be low, in urban areas where the traffic is dense, message relay may face unavoidable delays. To that end, a routing protocol, namely DTRP, is proposed by Saleet et al. (2010) . In DTRP, the gateway constructs a set of routes between itself and the mobile nodes based on its view about the local network topology. Nevertheless, one should note that if these routes consist of intermediate mobile nodes, they cannot be considered to be stable due to intermediate nodes' mobility. To increase their stability, DTRP builds routes based on intermediate and adjacent road intersections towards the gateway. These routes are called backbone routes. In order to meet the end-to-end delay requirement, the selected backbone routes should have high connectivity probability. In low-density roads, one way to increase the connectivity probability is to increase the road density increases, the transmission range should be reduced to avoid high interference, but the transmission range should still guarantee high connectivity. Hence, in DTRP, the gateway will decide on the transmission range that each vehicle should use in order to achieve high route connectivity. It is worth noting that VANETs exhibit different behaviors depending on the traffic volume. This implies a variation in the traffic patterns, which DTRP aims to mitigate.
In many of the proposed architectures, the authors also take into account the absence of fixed roadside network providing the VANET participants with mobile gateways. A multi-layer cooperation framework is proposed by Iera et al. (2007) that explores exactly this possibility. In this architecture the gateway, which can be either fixed roadside equipment or a mobile node, has a central role. The gateway must have the ability of both the external network and the vehicular network to match user preferences and QoS requirements. Furthermore, the gateway has to be provided with communication and negotiation capability towards the external network and also the VANET nodes. The roadside (fixed) gateways are more prone to route Internet traffic, but there is no limitation since the "best" route is always chosen based on certain criteria. What is innovative in this approach is that while searching for the most efficient route the packets exchanged between the gateway and the sender node contain network information concerning delay, throughput, link lifetime, etc. The gateway, which is capable of interpreting that information, uses them additionally to make a decision about the best possible route (see Table 2 ).
In this section, we have investigated vehicleto-infrastructure communications, and the challenges that they pose to efficient QoS provision in vehicular environment. We explored the tradeoffs that can greatly affect the quality of service provision in vehicular networks and presented additional detail on the weaknesses and strengths of the current research. We have also overviewed several vehicle-to-infrastructure quality of service provision schemes, mechanisms and targeted protocols and categorized them by employing various criteria. This categorization allowed us to identify the current problems of QoS provision in vehicular-to-infrastructure communications. We carefully reviewed these issues and illuminated the proposed solutions for each of them.
ROUTING AND MESSAGE FORWARDING ISSUES
Routing is one of the key research issues in vehicular networks as long as it supports most emerging applications. Vehicular communications require fast and reliable communication between cars (vehicle-to-vehicle) or between a car and a roadside unit (vehicle-to-infrastructure) . In the context of this chapter, we only examine the vehicle-to-infrastructure side of the vehicular communication routing process. The greatest advantage of infrastructure-based communication is the fact that the density of the equipped cars needed for a working application is much smaller than in the case of a VANET.
Characteristics of InfrastructureAssisted Routing in Vehicular Networks
In this section of the chapter, we explore the case of infrastructure exploitation by routing protocols in order to improve the routing process in vehicular networks. Due to the fact that the improvement in routing achieved by infrastructure exploitation in vehicular networks is great, there has been an emerging set of routing protocols tailored specifically for vehicle-to-infrastructure environment. Summarizing the above, the definitive characteristic of V2I communications in order to maximize the routing performance of the network is:
• Infrastructure exploitation: A situation that many protocols neglect is the existence of previous infrastructure along the roads. Such infrastructure consists of devices deployed by road operators and private telecommunications companies. Routing protocols could benefit a lot from those devices, which could act as relays, buffers, and so on. Moreover, useful information about the traffic state could be obtained from them, helping algorithms to make more intelligent decisions.
Several characteristics (Toor, Muhlethaler, & Laouiti, 2008) However, there are also disadvantages in the use of infrastructure in the routing process. This could seem as no surprise that avoiding the use of single point message aggregating equipment.
Due to the high degree of the centralization, the server can become a bottleneck or even a single point of failure. However, the main reason not to use a centralized system for managing traffic information could very well be non-technical; it simply does not seem to be desirable to hand the control of this data over to one central authority, potentially limiting the access to data collected jointly by all traffic participants.
On the other hand, there are some special traits to vehicular networks and their participants that help in making the routing process more efficient and improve the network performance in overall. Such traits are (Nekovee, 2005 ):
• Patterned Mobility: Vehicles follow a certain mobility pattern that is a function of the underlying roads, the traffic lights, the speed limit, traffic condition, and drivers' driving behaviors. Because of the particular mobility pattern, we can predict vehicle movement and design routing protocols exploiting this particular fact to make data dissemination in vehicular environment less challenging.
• Unlimited Battery Power and Storage: Nodes in VANETs are not subject to power and storage limitation as in sensor networks, another class of ad hoc networks where nodes are mostly static. Nodes are assumed to have ample energy and computing power. Therefore, optimizing duty cycle is not as relevant as it is in sensor networks.
• On-board Sensors: Nodes are assumed to be equipped with sensors to provide information useful for routing purposes. Many VANET routing protocols have assumed the availability of GPS unit from on-board Navigation system. Location information from GPS unit and speed from speedometer provides good examples for plethora of information that can possibly be obtained by sensors to be utilized to enhance routing decisions.
Routing Modes in Vehicular Communications: Vehicle-toInfrastructure Broadcast
Data broadcast is an attractive solution for largescale data dissemination. In contrast to unicast, where a data item must be transmitted many times to answer multiple requests, broadcast has the potential to satisfy all outstanding requests for the same data item with a single response. The participation of RSU in the routing process involves broadcast techniques from the RSU to the participants of the network. The two most common ways, are the pull-based approach and the pushbased approach. We then outline the basics about these two concepts (Vishal & Narottam, 2010) .
Pull-Based Broadcast Dissemination
In pull-based broadcast, commonly known as on demand broadcast, the RSU disseminates data items in response to explicit requests submitted by vehicles. Compared to its push-based counterpart, pull based is more scalable to large size databases. This broadcast model is reactive.
Push-Based Data Dissemination
In push-based broadcast, the Road Side Unit broadcasts the whole or part of the database periodically according to a static broadcast program. All vehicles listen passively to the broadcast channel to retrieve data items of interest without sending any request. This broadcast model is proactive.
Infrastructure-Assisted Routing: Proposed Solutions
In this subsection, we study several proposed solutions for VANET routing that improve the performance of the network by utilizing the roadside network. As mentioned in the quality of service subchapter, several routing protocols make use of the roadside network to provide quality of service in it, so we also explore these scenarios from the routing scope. A protocol that we studied under a different scope in the quality of service subchapter is also examined here. Sun et al. (2006) propose the GVGrid routing protocol, namely. This protocol assumes that every node (vehicle) has a short-range wireless device that has the same transmission range across the network nodes. GVGrid partitions the geographic region into squares of equal-size called grids. During route discovery, GVGrid attempts to find the route that is expected to have long lifetime, based on the position of each vehicle.
This expected lifetime of a route is determined by the vehicles' movement on that route and characteristics (such as traffic signals and stop signs) of the roads on which the route is based.
In dense urban areas, where the traffic load grows exponentially, it is expected to have certain unavoidable delays in the routing of the messages. To mitigate the effect of those delays to the network's performance, Saleet et al. (2010) propose a delay tolerant routing protocol, namely DTRP. In DTRP, the gateway constructs a set of routes between itself and the mobile nodes based on its view about the local network topology. Nevertheless, one should note that if these routes consist of intermediate mobile nodes, these routes cannot be considered to be stable due to intermediate nodes' mobility. Hence, in DTRP, the gateway will decide on the transmission range that each vehicle should use in order to achieve high route connectivity. It is worth noting that VANETs exhibit different behaviors depending on the traffic volume. This implies a variation in the traffic patterns, which DTRP aims to mitigate.
In the standardized (IEEE 802.11p) communication architecture for vehicular networks, a channel is always dedicated to safety messages. Based on that, Ferreira et al. (2009) proposed an infrastructure-based solution found in Ferreira, Meireles, and Fonseca (2009) , where the RSU play a major role in rebroadcasting warning messages in the network. In this approach there exists a control channel, which is dedicated to service safety messages, along with a service channel to be used for the rest services. Every CCH interval will be divided into an Infrastructure Period (IP) and a Slotted Period (SloP). The IP is reserved for RSUs coordination and for beacon transmission by RSUs, where all vehicles should listen to the channel. The beacon contains information about the SloP. By using beacons, the RSU will know the time the event was triggered and, in the next beacon, will inform that a specific slot will be used to rebroadcast the message.
The TRAFIC Initiative
In Brahmi et al. (2010) , the TRAFIC initiative is explored, that utilizes the roadside infrastructure to improve routing in vehicular environment.
The TRAFIC project is a research and industrial initiative which aims to contribute to the global academic and industry effort to develop ITS systems. More specifically, TRAFIC defines a hybrid communication infrastructure that exploits the offered opportunities of inter-vehicle cooperation, as well as the advanced capabilities of communicating devices deployed along the roads. TRAFIC hybrid infrastructure gathers several communication components: a network infrastructure and a vehicular network. In particular, the network infrastructure consists of a wired/wireless access network (such as Wi-Fi/ DSRC access points, WiMAX access, 2G/3G access, etc.), a backbone, and a sensor network. The access network ensures connectivity between the vehicular network and the backbone. The sensor network helps in detecting fine granularity traffic and security statistics related to roads and vehicles conditions while the backbone ensures the IP connectivity and houses the value-added services offered to vehicle users.
Based on this initiative and what it offers, Brahmi et al. (2010) propose the TRAFIC Efficient Routing Protocol (TERP) that uses the hybrid communication infrastructure proposed in TRAFIC. It defines an end-to-end efficient routing policy based on using two routing approaches: trajectory-based using SIFTv2 (Simple Forwarding over trajectory Version 2) protocol and dynamic decision-based routing using LoP (LTT over Progress) which targeted for V2I routing. Depending on the role of the packet forwarder (source or intermediate nodes) and applications requirements, TERP selects the appropriate routing approach. However, we only examine the V2I case of the operating scenario. LoP relies on TRAFIC communication infrastructure and more specifically the Road Side Units (RSUs) deployed at road intersections. The RSUs can communicate with the vehicles within their coverage range and have knowledge of their local road topology (each RSU knows the neighboring RSUs).
Geographic routing also known as geocast has been one of the most popular approaches in infrastructure-aided routing. Borsetti et al. (2010) propose a routing scheme, based on geographic routing, to increase the reliability and range of multi-hop communications. The proposed approach works under the assumption that all the RSU components of the network have no delays to their inter-communications, and they can be thought of as one node in a network graph. Using this graph representation, topology-aware routing protocols would be able to compute more optimal routes and, when it is the case, efficiently route packets through the infrastructure.
In most cases, what infrastructure assistance can offer and which is difficult to achieve in a purely ad-hoc environment, is traffic comfort and traffic efficiency services (i.e. digital map download, paid services, etc.). Shen et al. (2008) propose a routing protocol with RSU-assistance for vehicular environment and especially for Internet access. The authors consider a hybrid VANET composed of vehicles constrained to move on roadways and sparse RSU deployment. This protocol works under the assumptions that every vehicle is equipped with a radio transceiver and a GPS receiver and have location awareness. Each RSU is directly connected to the Internet by high capacity cables, thus assuming that information can be exchanged among RSUs via the wired network with minimal delay. Additionally, both RSUs and vehicles are assumed to transmit at the same fixed power level. When a vehicle is out of transmission range of an RSU or physical obstacle block their communications, other vehicles will be used to relay the data traffic. Whenever a vehicle sends or relays a packet, it piggybacks its current location and mobility information, and the corresponding timestamp in the packet. This way, an RSU can obtain location and mobility information of all vehicles in the area
In both ad-hoc and hybrid vehicular environment, a factor of outmost importance for the success of the routing process is vehicular density. Gupta et al. (2010) recognizing exactly this important parameter proposed an RSU-assisted routing algorithm, namely VD4. In VD4, every time a vehicle passes an RSU, the following information is sent to it; the time of arrival of the vehicle (as a timestamp), the speed of the vehicle, the direction of movement, the data packets (if it has any). The data packets that are received by the RSU are marked with a unique sequence number, which is used to check for duplicity of the packet. If the packet is already present at the RSU, it is dropped otherwise it is forwarded to the farthest in range vehicle on the most optimal path as has been calculated by the delay model. However, it must be noted that this algorithm operates in a network under several assumptions. It is assumed that, the vehicles are sufficiently equipped with wireless transmitters that can transmit in a short range (100 m -200 m) for transmitting data packet whenever a vehicle reaches the vicinity of the original data packet carrying vehicle or to the RSU. In addition, every roadside intersection is equipped with a RSU, which is capable of storing data packets sent by vehicles as and when required. The information necessary for the proper routing is included by the source in the packet at the time of transmission. Each vehicle and RSU knows its present location using GPS. The RSU maintains the information of vehicles such as the speed, direction etc. that passed it and also an estimate of total number of vehicles present on each path at a given point in time. This information is periodically updated so that the evaluation of the optimal path may be done with the latest information. The vehicles are assumed to move with uniform speed on a path.
A representative example of infrastructureassisted routing and how it can improve the network's performance is presented by Yanlin et al. (2006) . The authors propose an RSU-assisted routing protocol. The RAR protocol is based on three concepts: sectors, advertisements, affiliations. A sector is the road surface between several RSUs. Advertisements are used to advertise new services and are broadcasted by the RSUs. When a vehicle receives an advertisement, it must decide if it will enter the new sector. If and when a vehicle changes sector, it must also change its affiliation. This change is mandatory for the RSU to be able to locate the vehicle within the sector and forward any packages to it via wireless means. In this protocol, the routing is singled-phased and involves discovering the best routes and using the RSUs as shortcuts. The infrastructure network is assumed to be a special sector and can decide based on the destination's address whether it is in the infrastructure network or in VANET. If the destination is in VANET, RSUs know the destination sector by querying other RSUs. At the end of this phase, the best route is discovered and routing performance is improved by limiting ad-hoc routing in a small scope (sectors) and utilizing backbone networks.
Many of the proposed routing protocols support both ad-hoc and hybrid routing for vehicular networks. This happens mainly because of the indistinguishable nature of the vehicular networks and because it would be costly to develop a protocol for a single type of communication. Rongxi et al. (2008) propose a routing scheme for hybrid vehicular environment. In the context of this chapter, we only examine the vehicleto-infrastructure part of this scheme. The basic concept is that, upon receiving a route request from a vehicle wanting to transmit data looks into its records to find out in which local peer group the destination belongs to. If the sender and the receiver move into the same group, the RSU update the corresponding fields in the received request and broadcasts the message to one-hop neighbors but also the neighboring RSUs. In the case that the sender and the destination moving in different local peer groups, the sender's RSU forwards the message to the destination's local peer group in an attempt to find a reliable RSU close to the destination and identify the actual destination vehicle. Once all these preconditions have been met, the destination's RSU sends a message to the corresponding RSU on sender's side which in turn informs the sender vehicle to start transmitting data that are routed via the two RSUs to the destination.
In this subchapter, we have overviewed vehicle-to-infrastructure routing, which is one of the most challenging tasks for vehicular communications. We have presented the advantages and disadvantages of the infrastructure utilization to assist vehicular communications and particularly the routing process. We have examined in what degree the infrastructure penetration in the network affects the performance of the network and what effects this might have on safety or infotainment message dissemination. We have identified and analyzed the current problems that vehicular routing faces. Furthermore, we have aggregated and categorized several proposed solutions, which include mechanisms, schemes, and targeted protocols for this matter.
THE FUTURE OF VEHICLE-TO-INFRASTRUCTURE COMMUNICATIONS
It is a fact that the V2I communication model is more expensive compared to its ad-hoc counterpart; however, it is also a fact that the V2I communications have much yet to offer in all aspects of the vehicular environment, from active safety to infotainment services. Vehicular communications are becoming a reality because the market has recognized the significance that they will have in the near future. This alone gives a promising development for the proposed technologies. Market penetration will play an important role in this particular field due to the funds that will push its development. However, the penetration of vehicular network technology is still weak, hence there is a need for a minimum of infrastructure support to increase the penetration by the provision of helpful services. At the same time, deploying new infrastructure for these networks necessitate a lot of investment and at a high cost. The main conclusion of the current chapter is that Vehicle-toInfrastructure Communications will help towards the improvement of the active and passive road safety on the road.
CONCLUSION
Concluding this chapter, we have discussed extensively about vehicular communications networks. In particular, we have analyzed the vehicle-toinfrastructure component of this hybrid network. We have also performed a survey on some of the most challenging tasks for V2I communications, such as security and privacy, quality of service provision and routing issues. We have investigated occasions in which the infrastructure element assisted in overcoming several problems, but also when it worsened the performance of the network. In each subchapter, we have provided a detailed categorization of the problems and challenges that exist in each respective field of interest, and presented several proposed solutions that make use of the infrastructure element to provide a solution for the studied problems. However, the realization for many of those scenarios still demands heavy deployment of the roadside infrastructure to support the network and the desired needs and applications.
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS):
Is a worldwide initiative to add information and communications technology to transport infrastructure and vehicles.
Mobile Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN): A type of network in which a mobile user can connect to a Local Area Network (LAN) through a wireless (radio) connection.
